Towards a Design Framework for Legitimate Public Private Partnerships: A General Approach Applied to Innovative Renewable Energy Infrastructures by Heldeweg, M.A. & Sanders, M.P.T.
EPPPL 3|2014 187Towards a Design Framework for Legitimate PPPs
Towards a Design Framework for Legitimate
Public Private Partnerships
A General Approach Applied to Innovative Renewable Energy
Infrastructures
Michiel A. Heldeweg and Maurits Ph.Th. Sanders*
This article provides a framework to guide the choice and design of a fitting Public Private
Partnerships (PPP), which is applied to a Dutch example of biogas/sustainable energy
projects. The framework focuses on ‘legitimate public governance’, merging Beetham’s di-
mensions of legitimacy (legality, shared beliefs and consent) with three types of governance
mechanisms (market, network and hierarchy). This leads to three types of PPP, and six phas-
es of design, allowing governments to perform an ex ante analysis, by which legal form of
PPP-type follows PPP-function, while securing and monitoring legitimate public governance.
I. Introduction
In order to achieve a low carbon economy in 2050,
the Dutch government, by concluding climate agree-
ments at the national and international level,1 com-
mitted itself to the domestic target of a 16% share of
energy consumption from renewable sources by
2020.2 To achieve such sustainability ambitions, it is
dependent on technological innovations in the ener-
gy sector.3 As one of various strategies towards en-
hancing innovation, the Dutch government initiates
policy projects in partnership with private parties.4
This article explores the design of legitimate public
private partnerships (PPP) as a public interest tool to
enhance innovation, using the challenge of innova-
tion in renewable energy provision as its core exam-
ple. We propose a general framework, intended to
support the design of fitting PPP-arrangements, and
apply this especially to projects on renewable ener-
gy utilities.
There are various examples of renewable energy
projects in the Netherlands. The collective purchas-
ing of solar panels and offshore windmill parks is
one attracting considerable interest. Another impor-
tant category of initiatives is that of projects in the
field of biogas.5 Such projects demonstrate the need
for policy tools to respond to the dynamics in inno-
vation processes. To this end we present an ex-ante
analysis framework relevant to the selection and de-
sign of appropriate and legitimate forms of PPP.
These forms are illustrated by distinct types of organ-
isations and policy-arrangements which make them
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1 European Commission, 2011, A roadmap for moving to a com-
petitive low carbon economy in 2050, COM (2011) 112 final.
Brussels.
2 Ministery of Economic Affairs, 2013. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/
onderwerpen/energie/meer-hernieuwbare-energie, 2013 (ac-
cessed 14 May 2013).
3 Negro/Hekkert/Smits, Explaining the failure of the Dutch innova-
tion system for biomass digestion – A functional analysis, Energy
Policy 35/2007, p. 925-938. Lund/Clark, Sustainable energy and
transportation systems introduction and overview, Utilities Policy
16/2008, p. 59-62. Brandstätt/Brunekreeft/Friedrichsen, Location-
al signals to reduce network investments in smart distribution
grids: What works and what not? Utilities Policy 19/2011, p. 244-
254.
4 Sanders, “Regulating public-private modalities of legitimate
innovation: an ex ante analysis framework”, in Heldeweg/Kica
(eds.), Regulating technological innovations. An interdisciplinary
approach. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills 2011, pp. 152-168.
Heldeweg/Sanders, Good Legal Goverance in Authoritative
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ships with Public Authority. EPPPL 2/2013, p. 175-185.
5 Negro/Hekkert/Smits, Explaining the failure of the Dutch innova-
tion system for biomass digestion – A functional analysis, Energy
Policy 35/2007, p. 925-938.
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appropriate for renewable energy utility projects.
The analysis framework is presented as a phased
plan, which underpins the proper selection of PPP-
type and legal form in the context of projects on re-
newable energy utilities. Ultimately this is a matter
of balancing between legal-administrative values of
effectiveness and legitimacy. In this article the focus
is on legitimacy, although of course we realize that
there are possible trade-offs and there is reciprocity
in that legitimacy and effectiveness are necessary but
insufficient conditions to each other’s successes.
In this article we will first briefly analyse the
changes in the Dutch energy sector in the light of the
policy ambitions of the European Union, against the
backdrop of the public interest concept of the Dutch
ScientificCouncil forGovernmentPolicy (WRR).The
results of the analysis are presented in section II. In
section III we reflect on the changes in the Dutch en-
ergy sector and in section IV we argue why an ex-
ante analysis framework is relevant to the selection
and design of appropriate and legitimate forms of
PPP suitable to Renewable Energy Infrastructure
projects. At this we build upon thework of Beetham6
on the legitimacy of public power. The ex-ante analy-
sis framework is presented in section V.
II. Changes in Dutch Energy Governance
1. The Ownership Unbundling of
Distribution and Supply Companies
Recent decades have shownmajor changes in the en-
ergy sector in theNetherlands.7Oneof themost strik-
ing changes is the splitting of the integrated energy
companies; separating the network activities from
the production and supply activities.8 These activi-
ties were subsequently placed in newly established,
dedicated organisations, based upon original public
enterprises, but henceforth coordinated au-
tonomously. Firstly, network companies were set up.
These companies are responsible for the distribution
activities and are regulated hierarchically within the
realmofgovernment.9Secondly, productionandsup-
ply companies were established. The activities of
these latter organisations have been placed at arms’
length from government (generally also by selling
government shares), so that the operations of thepro-
duction and supply companies take place in the ‘free’
energy market.10
2. Public Interest Concept
The concept of public interest is important to under-
standing legitimacy-considerations behind these en-
ergy sector reforms.11 In its report, “The safeguard-
ing of public interest”, the Dutch Scientific Council
for Government Policy (WRR) makes a distinction
between three types of interests: (i) individual, (ii)
societal and (iii) public interests.12Whilst individual
interests are regarded as of a personal nature, the
WRR defines societal interests as interests relevant
to society as a whole – such as energy, but also food,
transport, education, (health)care and others. Ac-
cording to the WRR, a societal interest becomes a
public interest if and when government commits it-
self to (the protection of) a particular societal inter-
est on the basis of the conviction that this interest
will not otherwise be properly served (or safeguard-
ed).13
From the standpoint of liberal democracy, it is im-
portant to note here that the mere fact that a societal
interest, such as renewable energy supply, is regard-
ed (by government) as a public interest, does not ex-
clude the possibility for private persons to (continue
to) spontaneously (and without obligation) involve
themselves with renewable energy as a societal inter-
est. Matters with a public interest do not (automati-
cally) belong to the exclusive zone of government,
but one may expect that private involvement will be
6 Beetham, The legitimation of power, Palgrave, Houndmills 1991.
7 Brunekreeft, The 1996 reform of the electricity supply industry in
The Netherlands. Utilities Policy 6/1997, 117-126. Van Damme,
Liberalizing the Dutch Electricity Market: 1998-2004, CentER and
TILEC, Tilburg University 2005. Baarsma/De Nooij/Koster/Van
der Weijden, Divide and rule. The economic and legal implica-
tions of the proposed ownership unbundling of distribution and
supply companies in the Dutch electricity sector. Utilities Policy
35/2007, p. 1785-1794.
8 Brunekreeft (fn. 7). Baarsma/De Nooij/Koster/Van der Weijden
(fn. 7).
9 Brunekreeft (fn. 7). Baarsma/De Nooij/Koster/Van der Weijden
(fn. 7). Kist/Crone/Hudig/Ketting/De Swaan/Willems, Publiek
aandeelhouderschap energiebedrijven. Ministerie van Economis-
che Zaken, Den Haag 2008.
10 Brunekreeft (fn. 7). Baarsma/De Nooij/Koster/Van der Weijden
(fn. 7). Kist/Crone/Hudig/Ketting/De Swaan/Willems (fn. 9).
11 Jamasb/Pollitt, Electricity market reform in the European Union:
Review of Progress towards Liberalization & Integration. Working
Paper Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
003/2005. Kist/Crone/Hudig/Ketting/De Swaan/Willems (fn. 9).
12 Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), Het
borgen van het publiek belang. Rapporten aan de regering nr. 56,
Den Haag 2000.
13 WRR (fn. 12).
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affected by government (regulation), as may be the
case when in pursuit of renewable energy objectives,
government advances certain resource alternatives
over others.
3. Energy Sector Reforms
The aforementioned energy sector reforms are the
result of various political stands on related public in-
terests.14 A number of parties represent important
positions in the sectoral debate. First of all, the Euro-
pean Commission is important as it may be regard-
ed as the leading protagonist of the liberalisation
wave in the energy sector. The Commission puts the
public interest of a properly functioning, inter-
nal/common energymarket, and accompanying con-
sumer protection, at the forefront of its policy choic-
es underlying the European liberalisation direc-
tives.15 In the energymarket the consumer shall have
a proper freedom of choice. As a result the consumer
may not be dependent on just the one provider (a
monopolist) of energy. Instead the buyer of energy
should be able to make a comparison between differ-
ent producers and suppliers, to then select the
provider that (best) meets his energy demand. The
main objective is that the price mechanism steers
buyers and energy companies towards an optimum
transaction.
Despite the European impetus to liberalise utility
sectors, such as the energy sector, the degree of lib-
eralisation and the approach used, do in practice dif-
fer from one Member State to another.16 The imple-
mentation of the Commission’s policy is thus subject
to ‘the powers that be’ within the Member States,17
especially the positions of national authorities, such
as Ministers of Economic Affairs or of Energy (and
other utilities) and the national Parliaments. In the
Dutch case, especiallymembers of parliament feared
that the public interests of security of supply and of
the quality of the distribution network would come
under pressure if the activities of integrated energy
companies were to be organised independent from
government. Consequently, the outcome of the polit-
ical debate was that these public interests were to be
safeguarded by separating the energy network man-
agement, both economically and legally, from that of
the production and supply of energy.18
III. Upon Reflection
Especially in the field of biogas, there seem to be
promising possibilities to respond to the climate
change challenge.Hence, theDutchprovince ofOver-
ijssel decided to initiate the production and supply
of biogas and/or green gas to consumers (households
and/or businesses). A regional energy infrastructure,
called a ‘GreenGasHub’,was consideredvital tomake
this work. In a Green Gas Hub, producers of biogas,
such as pig farmers and market gardeners, supply
their biogas to a central plant through a pipe. In this
central plant the biogas is upgraded to the natural
gas quality (green gas) and the end-product can be
fed into the natural gas network, which exists
throughout Overijssel (and indeed throughout the
Netherlands). Similar initiatives are in the provinces
Friesland and Gelderland.
Clearly, government has an active role to play in
both the initiation and the executionof suchprojects.
This role-perception is in keeping with the outline
of the “New energy for the climate” work pro-
gramme. The work programme speaks of an initiat-
ing role for government so that test beds emerge for
the application of innovative energy-saving tech-
niques.19
Meanwhile, a fundamental question arises in the
context of the earlier liberalisation wave in the ener-
gy sector. Liberalisation did, after all, have as its con-
sequence that the players in the energy sector were
placed at arm’s length of government. How then can
the public renewable energy interest still be safe-
guarded, given that markets and civil networks fail
in spontaneously organising (viable) green gas initia-
tives? How can government be involved to remedy
this failure without infringing upon liberalisation?
The national “New energy for the climate” work pro-
gramme proposes to solve this problem through the
14 Jamasb/Pollitt (fn. 11).
15 Wilkeshuis, Publieke belangen en nutssectoren. Op weg naar een
juridisch afwegingskader, Dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Amster-
dam, Amsterdam 2010. Burkard, The Making of the European
Energy Market: The Interplay of Governance and Government,
Journal of Public Policy 28/2008, p. 73-92.
16 Jamasb/Pollitt (fn. 11). Wilkeshuis (fn. 15).
17 See, applied to the Dutch case, Wilkeshuis (fn. 15).
18 See the Independent Grid Management Act (Wet Onafhankelijk
Netbeheer), 23 November 2006, OJ 2006, 614 (amended).
19 VROM, Nieuwe energie voor het klimaat. Werkprogramma
schoon en zuinig, Den Haag 2007.
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use of public private partnership (PPP).20 Unfortu-
nately, the responsible Ministry of Housing, Spatial
Planning & the Environment (VROM) does not pro-
vide any further elaboration on this line of thinking.
This iswhere this articlemay be relevant as it aims
to assess the various governance opportunities and
pitfalls of PPP, and to make suggestions as to a prop-
er appraisal of dedicated PPP-governance arrange-
ments. The proposal of an ex-ante analysis frame-
work is key to this attempt. The focus of this frame-
work will be on legitimate public governance, as our
point of departure lies with the public renewable en-
ergy interest and the related use of government re-
sources and influence (legal and otherwise). Clearly,
the mere fact that PPP is – as it is in the Netherlands
– ‘officially’ proposed by government as a means to
effectively realise innovative renewable energy infra-
structures, does not in itself provide a sufficient un-
derpinning of legitimate PPPs in coordinating inno-
vative action in the energy field. In this day and age
of governance,21 the complex interactive nature of
PPP22 calls for amore substantive analysis of the log-
ic and possible merits of PPP-arrangements, also
when the focus is limited to legitimacy.
Of course, in abroaderperspective, ‘there aremore
roads that lead to Rome’. Governments may use oth-
er instruments besides PPP, such as private involve-
ment in public enterprises23 and facultative regula-
tion, such as by subsidies,24 to involve private parties
in service of public interests. Often, instrument com-
binations are made, and so PPP may be combined
with public enterprises and with regulation. In this
article however, for theoretical purposes, wewill pur-
sue a ‘stand alone’ approach.
In the following we first give a brief description
of the concept of ‘legitimate public governance’. Sub-
sequently, we will name the main steps towards a
proper choice of PPP formats and clarify, also by pro-
viding practical description, which types of PPP can
be employed especially towards renewable energy
objectives.
IV. Legitimate Public Governance
1. Legitimacy
To arrive at a concept of ‘legitimate public gover-
nance’, we chose to merge specific approaches on
both the legitimacy of public authority and the no-
tion of public governance as coordination of transac-
tions involved in creating and allocating public
goods, works and services.
In the public administration and public policy lit-
erature, the concept of legitimacy has received con-
siderableattentionfromvariousauthors.25Beetham’s
view on legitimacy of the public exercise of authori-
ty is especially useful our needs. Firstly, it provides a
cross-disciplinaryperspective (encompassingnorma-
tive and socio-empirical disciplines). Secondly,
Beetham’s three dimensions of legitimacy26 may be
used, not only to ex-post empirically test a given ex-
ercise of public authority, but also to serve as step-
ping stones of an ex ante analysis framework, lead-
ing to a proper – legitimate – choice and design of
the applicable governance arrangement, such as PPP.
The three dimensions, which together constitute
the – cumulative – conditions for legitimate exercise
of public authority, are: 1. legality; 2. shared beliefs;
3. consent. Table 127 presents a summary:
Dimension 1. (‘legality’), requires legally valid exer-
cise of authority, in accordance with written and un-
written rules of law.28Such rulesmake (autonomous)
social regulation possible, given government’s adher-
ence to law, under the ‘rule of law’.29
Dimension 2. (‘shared beliefs’), requires that bind-
ing rules are intrinsically justified.30 They should be
20 The European Commission is also seeking its salvation in PPP,
witness some major initiatives, especially where innovation is
important. An example of this is the Green Vehicles Initiative; see
http://www.egvi.eu/ (accessed 9 July 2014).
21 Rhodes, Understanding governance, Open University Press,
Buckingham 1997.
22 Hodge/Greve/Boardman, “Introduction: the PPP phenomenon
and its evaluation” in Hodge/Greve/Boardman (eds.) Internation-
al handbook on public-private partnerships, Edward Elgar, Chel-
tenham 2010.
23 Beecher, Privatization, Monopoly, and Structured Competition in
the Water Industry: Is There a Role for Regulation?, Journal of
Contemporary Water Research and Education (Vol. 117) 1/2000,
p. 13-20.
24 Sanders/Heldeweg/Straatman/Wempe, Energy policy by beauty
contests: the legitimacy of interactive sustainability policies at
regional levels of the regulatory state. In: Energy Sustainability
and Society 4:4/2014, p. 1-13.
25 e.g. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Mohr, Tübingen 1922.
Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am
Main 1969. Beetham (fn. 6). Scharpf, Governing in Europe.
Effective and Democratic? Oxford University Press 1999.
26 Beetham (fn. 6), pp. 15-16.
27 Table drawn from Beetham (fn. 6), p. 20, table 1.1.
28 Ibid, p. 64 et seq.
29 Heldeweg/Sanders (fn. 4).
30 Beetham (fn. 6), p. 69 et seq)
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based on ‘normative principles’, expressive of shared
value perceptions concerning the citizen-govern-
ment relationship (regulator and regulatee respec-
tively). In turn these principles need justification ei-
ther from their origin (vested in some accepted ‘so-
cietal source’, such as parliament) or from their con-
tent (vested in substantive convictions, such as on
distributive justice).31
Dimension 3. (‘consent’), refers to voluntary con-
sent of the subordinate(s) with the political exercise
of power by the dominant actor,32 as by democratic
mechanisms.33
These dimensions are traceable not only in gover-
nance contexts where government operates hierar-
chically – such as by compelling energy producers
by law to apply (a certain percentage of) renewable
resources. They also apply in other governance con-
texts where government is involved in the explicit
pursuit of the public (energy) interest. Firstly, when
government builds on market transactions, such as
in a ‘green energy criterion’ used in tendering for
public transport, to achieve its objectives. Secondly,
when social network interaction is employed, such
as in negotiating with housing corporations and oth-
er NGOs on green energy initiatives in urban areas.
This broad use is in keeping with Beetham’s claim
that his approach is universally applicable and that,
of course, it can be specified, “… to assess the legiti-
macy of power in its context, i.e. against the norms
and values of a given society.”34
2. Types of Coordination
Thus government can, as with determining how to
pursue its renewable energypolicy objectives, choose
between three types of coordination, as transaction
mechanisms by, or arenas in which public goods,
works and services are created and allocated: (i) mar-
ket, (ii) network, or (iii) hierarchical coordination.35
Market coordination is useful to government poli-
cies especially when government wants to match ef-
fectiveness with efficiency, through a voluntary ex-
change between supply and demand. Government
regulation may secure that, for example, energy pro-
ducers must use renewable energy, which then caus-
es these producers to approach the energy resources
market and enter into transactions with suppliers.
Ideally, these transactions follow from a comparison
between competitive alternatives, based on full in-
formation and with the aim of optimizing welfare.
Hierarchical coordination (in the public realm)36
exists when public interests are pursued by govern-
ment control. Subordinate private citizens and pub-
lic parties operate under regulatory command, com-
pelled to act in accordance with given norms or tech-
nical requirements, functional to a public interest ob-
jective.37 Effectiveness and efficiency are served by
the ability of unilateral (‘top-down) government ac-
31 Heldeweg/Sanders (fn. 4).
32 Beetham (fn. 6), p. 91 et seq)
33 Heldeweg/Sanders (fn. 4).
34 Beetham (fn. 6), p. 21.
35 Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network forms of organi-
zation, Research in Organizational Behavior 12/1990, pp. 295-
336. Levačić, “Markets and government: an overview” in Thomp-
son/Frances/Levačić/Mitchell (eds.), Markets, hierarchies & net-
works. The coordination of social life, Sage, London 1991.
36 Private firms often include hierarchical coordination (as well as
private property regimes may do in owner-user relations), but lay
outside this article’s scope.
37 This description allows for regulation, not only by legal incentives
(strictly binding rules), but also by economic incentives (e.g.
taxes, subsidies), ethical incentives (e.g. openness, public infor-
mation) and technical incentives (public works & infrastructures).
See Rhodes (fn. 21) for a clear positioning of government (hierar-
chy) against governance – although we consider government/hier-
archy as a mode of governance.
Table 1: The three dimensions of legitimacy
Criteria of Legitimacy Form of Non-legitimate Power
1. Conformity to rules (legal validity) Illegitimacy (breach of rules)
2. Justifiability to rules in terms of shared beliefs Legitimacy deficit (discrepancy between rules and supporting
beliefs, absence of shared beliefs)
3. Legitimation through expressed consent Delegitimation (withdrawal of consent)
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tion, such as inprohibitions or commands in the field
of (non) renewable energy resources or energy effi-
ciency.
Network coordination is useful to government by
providing a setting in which the participating au-
tonomous actors try to reach agreement on a strate-
gy to achieve a policy goal. It is not the price mecha-
nismthat controlsnetwork transactions, as is the case
with the market, nor unilateral authority, as in a hi-
erarchical setting. Instead, it is the consensual inter-
action between equal parties, participating towards
a shared opinion and shared or aligned action, given
a mutual dependency of participants in – optimally
– reaching a shared objective.38 As government, for
instance, seeks to promote innovative renewable en-
ergy projects, it may want to join forces with societal
actors who share in the desire to get such projects
underway, but fail to do some by themselves.
3. Cross Referencing
We may now combine Beetham’s view on legitima-
cy with the above three types of public governance,
involving government in pursuit of public interests,
such as that of renewable energy – together present-
ing a framework of legitimate public governance.
The cross-sections that we yield are basic gover-
nancearrangements, asoptional typesof transaction-
actor combinations, and related conditions. In this
articlewe limit our analysis to the legitimacyperspec-
tive of these governance arrangements. This means
that we do not elaborate on the aspects of compara-
tive effectiveness and efficiency, which each arrange-
ment may provide, given the nature of the relevant
policy area – such as that of renewable energy. Our
scope is limited to the analytical perspective as pre-
sented in Table 2.
Of course these three types of coordination are ide-
al types. Furthermore, and especially with the exam-
ples given, government may choose different forms
to shape its use of any of the three possible types of
coordination. These forms may relate especially to
theuseofdifferent typesof legalpersonalitybywhich
government operates within these mechanisms. Of
these there are many, both as public law types (e.g.
parliaments,ministers, municipalities, quangos) and
of private law (e.g. associations, foundations/trusts,
enterprises). Clearly, apart from aspects of effective-
ness and efficiency (which are not addressed here as
apositive appraisal ofbotheffectiveness andefficien-
cy is theoretically presumed), the aspect of legitima-
cy, as conceptualised within a certain type of coordi-
nation, may either necessitate or exclude certain le-
gal forms, such as a public body rather than a private
enterprise as sovereign legislator. Similarly, aswewill
show in the below, the possibility of a PPP approach
existswithin each type of coordination, butwill come
indifferent formsof PPP,which in turn shouldmatch
(besides considerations of effectiveness and efficien-
cy) legitimacy requirements. As we stated in the
above (at the end of paragraph 3), in practice other
aspects, such as that of public service regulation (al-
so related to markets and networks), may come into
play and of course will influence upon choice and
performance of PPP’s, also in terms of legitimacy –
but we leave these ‘contingencies’ aside here.
V. Ex ante Analysis Framework
Against the backdrop of this analytical perspective
we can now present a concise framework that en-
38 Powell (fn. 35).
Table 2: Cross-referencing legitimacy and public governance
‘Legitimate Public Governance’
Legitimacy according to
Beetham
Public Governance in three types of coordination
Market (M) Network (N) Hierarchy (H)
3 dimensions: legal, shared
beliefs, consent
To be discussed – see results
in table 3
To be discussed – see results
in table 3
To be discussed – see results
in table 3
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ables an ex ante analysis, providing a guideline to
choosing and designing the proper and legitimate
public governance arrangement in the formof a PPP-
type of collaboration, as in the (Dutch) field of renew-
able energy initiatives.
The framework consists of a simple phased plan
with six consecutive steps:
(i) establishing the public interest (i.e. is there a role
to play for government and if so, in what substan-
tive terms?);
(ii) a systemic choice of legitimate public governance
(i.e. which normative stance is taken on the gen-
eral method of coordinating transactions relevant
to the particular public interest at hand?);
(iii) considering operational risks (i.e. what are the
chances and negative effects of failure of the pre-
ferred method of coordination in the context of
specific projects?);
(iv) choosing the PPP type (i.e. which type of PPP
would fit best with the preferred/given method of
coordination and meanwhile be able to avoid or
remedy operational risks of failure as identified in
iii?);
(v) choosing the legal form (i.e. which legal form is
most suitable to make the PPP performwithin the
relevantmethod of coordination and contribute to
its properworking in the transactions relevant the
PPP’s purpose?);
(vi) putting controls into place (i.e. which control
mechanisms are necessary to avoid or address
residual operational risks, especially as caused by
rash and opportunistic behaviour?)
1. Step 1: Establishing the Public Interest
In advance of a government conclusion to apply PPP,
it must decide whether it has any role to play in the
promotion or protection of a societal interest, such
as renewable energy utilities. As follows from the
above discussion on different types of interests, such
involvement is not necessary per se. Many societal
interests are in fact taken care of without (dedicated)
government involvement39 However, especially in-
novative and sustainable quality and universal acces-
sibility of public utility services can be problematic.
Government may have to step in to provide safe-
guards – i.e. on the basis of the conviction that jus-
tice might otherwise not be fully done to the under-
lying societal interest concerned.40
Onemayargue that in suchcaseswewitness forms
of market or network failure, as markets and/or net-
works seem incapable of adequately providing for –
proper quality of and access to – these utilities. Con-
sequently, on the basis of political assessment, argu-
mentation and debate, government can decide to
make the involved societal interest object of its poli-
cy, thus labelling it (also) as a public interest.41Aswe
have seen in the above, in the Netherlands the soci-
etal interest of proper renewable energy utilities has
acquired this status by virtue of the “New energy for
the climate” programme.
The (pre-eminently political) decision to consider
service to a societal interest to be a public interest
should be distinguished from the decision on how
government is to perform its task and should be held
accountable.Weneed to, in otherwords, separate the
‘what’ (may be considered a public interest?) from
the ‘how’ (to promote and protect a public interest).42
To proclaim, for instance, investment in renewable
energy utilities to be a public interest, is not to say
that only government may decide on this policy and
only government may be involved in the execution
of it. First of all, setting the energy policy may be a
subject for which government seeks counsel with in-
dustry and NGOs. Secondly, executing energy policy
may also involve bringing in private parties.43 Of
course, the final public responsibility for both poli-
cy and execution rests with government, but that
does not exclude express arrangements made to fa-
cilitate private party involvement – quite apart from
spontaneous private initiatives.
Clearly, these express arrangements require care-
ful consideration because the mere fact of govern-
ment involvement is a response to existing market
and/or of network failure – as in the Dutch case of
(not) establishing renewable energy utilities. Given
this failure, government cannot (or no longer) expect
unregulated private party participation to sponta-
neously deliver all the necessary input. This begs the
question if, leaving alternatives aside,44 such partic-
ipation is feasible through PPP and if so, how this in-
39 WRR (fn. 12), p. 20.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 21.
42 Ibid., p. 21.
43 Ibid., p. 21.
44 Beecher (fn. 23).
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put can be coordinated to provide its highest added
value.
Consequently, we are facedwith a two-step prelim-
inary considerationwhich is discussed in Steps 2 and
3 (as a prelude to the choices of PPP-type, form and
control in Steps 4, 5 and 6). ‘Step 2’ will be about con-
sidering options in terms ofmodes of legitimate pub-
lic governance, whereas Step 3 will be concerned
with specific innovation risks related to particular
modes of governance.
2. Step 2: The Systemic Choice of a
Legitimate Mode of Public Governance
Where government takes final responsibility for the
public interest of service to a particular societal inter-
est, such as setting-up renewable energy utilities, this
will be in the face of given or expected failures in co-
ordinating transactions relevant to a certain interest.
A government’s prime decision will have to be on
whichmainmechanismof (or arena for) coordination
seems most suitable, the present or perhaps another.
If the present is still considered best, this express-
es the belief that failures of this system can be (rela-
tively best) remedied by operational government in-
terventions, regulatory or institutionally (with PPP
as an example of the latter form).
Alternatively, government interventions amount
to a systemic overhaul (or creation, if no practice ex-
ists, as with trading of CO2-allowances), such as we
witness in privatization or nationalization, for in-
stance of energy production and/or supply. If and
when government intervention is limited to an over-
haul, it is still likely that government will want to
safeguard success by introduction of additional reg-
ulatory and institutional constraints anddrivers. PPP
may be one of these (of an institutional kind), but we
need to tread with care and leave that decision to the
next two Steps (3 and 4) and focus on the general
type of coordination first.
As we saw in the above, there are three main and
ideal type forms of such coordination or modes of
public governance: (i) market, (ii) network and (iii)
hierarchy.
The distinctive characteristics of each of these
modes need to be considered in terms of the kind of
legitimacy that they may provide – as this is our fo-
cus here. For eachmode the specific configuration of
legitimacy characteristics needs to be evaluated as
systemic opportunities or positive indicators to se-
cure acceptance for a type of coordination as ameans
to coordinate certain public services. By contrast, we
regard Step 3 as rather being about operational con-
cerns orwarnings, listing negative indicators, follow-
ing the risks at possible governance/coordinative fail-
ures.
In comparing and considering systemic coordina-
tive opportunities, the liberal State doctrine provides
as a point of departure by which he concern over re-
newable energy should ideally be a (‘mere’) matter
of its promotion and safeguarding as a societal inter-
est by private parties. If and when (because of mar-
ket and/or network failure) this interest becomes a
public interest, government would still primarily
have to look for ways by which this concern could
primarilybe takenupwithprivateparty involvement
through regulated market or network coordination.
Only, ultimately, when all else fails, a public interest
– as that of renewable energy – may become a mat-
ter of exclusive government policy formulation and
execution, coordinated by hierarchy.
As we have, in Step 1, labelled renewable energy
as a public interest, we must now come to a compar-
ative assessment of governance modes, as expressed
by theirdistinct setsof coordinatingmechanismsand
accompanying value-orientations – without preju-
dice to hierarchical solutions.
The basic thinking in market coordination is that
economic agents acting rationally on the basis of full
information (the price of an economic good, such as
energy) make an assessment leading to an optimum
outcome (efficiency). This outcome demands a per-
fect market, consistent with two basic value-charac-
teristics: (i) ‘openness’ (as in transparency of infor-
mation) and (ii) fair competition (providing an ‘exit’
option, to open bargaining with others). In legal
terms these demands may be served by rules of con-
sumer protection and fair competition. As to the lat-
ter, PPPapplied inmarkets comeswithaspecial twist,
because in tendering or subsidising, government
must avoid disturbance ofmarkets as a ‘level playing
field’ (compare, for example, the stringent EU rules
on tendering and State aid).45
Network coordination is described in public ad-
ministration as a transaction mechanism enshrined
45 European Commission, On the modernisation of EU public
procurement policy. Towards a more efficient European Procure-
ment Market, COM(2011) 15 final, Brussels.
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in more or less stable patterns of voluntary relation-
ships between mutually dependent actors formed
aroundpolicy issues or policy programmes.46 In such
a situation, policy is the outcome of effective com-
munication. This type of communication requires,
firstly, inclusion and general acceptance. Indeed, all
relevant interests within the network must be repre-
sented and equally respected, and policy outcomes
reached are accepted by all participants (not neces-
sarily as consensus on all outcomes, but certainly on
principle). Secondly, effective communication im-
plies reciprocity, so that participants act accepting
that direct consideration may not always be provid-
ed. It goes without saying that this can only work if
‘inclusion’ is sufficiently upheld.
Hierarchical coordination is based upon the exer-
cise of public authority by government. Under the
Dutchdoctrine of public authority, for instance, three
clusters of values are considered vital.47 Firstly,
‘democracy’, as citizens’ voice over government pow-
er (with the primacy of general people’s representa-
tion – over ‘participation’), subsidiarity/ decentrali-
sation, and openness. Secondly, ‘liberal rule of law’
as the separation of State and society, the primacy of
civil autonomy, adherence of government to the law,
separation of powers, legality, fundamental rights, le-
gal protection, and embeddedness in the internation-
al legal order. Thirdly, ‘servient government’, as gov-
ernment does not exist for itself but for social justice
for all, and should pursue this objective effectively
and efficiently.
In the earlier perspective of legitimate public gov-
ernance, we can now merge the values listed in the
above to the three dimensions as proposed by
Beetham. Thus we yield three modes of (ideal type)
‘legitimate public governance’, which provide a nor-
mative beacon to government’s choice in choosing
the proper type of coordination as a context in which
to possibly, additionally apply (a type of) PPP. With-
out further elaboration, thesemodes are summarised
in Table 3.
3. Step 3: Considering Operational Risks
As a next Step, the systemic choice of a method or
type of coordination as outcomes of the afore analy-
sis requires a further analysis as there may be resid-
ual risks at failure, related to the characteristics of
the specific public interest (e.g. renewable energy),
also considering technical aspects (e.g. the use of a
grid), organisational aspects (i.e. the ‘action arena’
and players within), and aspects concerning policy
principles (e.g. universal and equal access). Each of
these aspects may lead government to conclude that,
46 Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan (eds), Managing complex networks:
Strategies for the public sector, Sage Publications, London 1997,
p. 6.
47 Heldeweg/Sanders (fn. 4).
Table 3: Legitimate value configurations of forms of coordination
Step 2: Considering options of legitimate public governance
Dimensions. Beetham 3 Modes of governance
Market Network Hierarchy
Legality Law on legal personality,
property, contract, competi-
tion and consumer protec-
tion
Law on legal personality and
societal enterprise
Constitutional & administra-
tive law (‘rule of law’)
Shared beliefs
(all: Liberal state)
Equal freedom, trade, effi-
ciency (‘Commutative jus-
tice’)
Voluntarism, collective ac-
tion, reciprocity (‘Commu-
nicative justice’)
Citizen autonomy, servient
government (‘Distributive
justice’)
Consent Reciprocal agreement (‘exit’) Inclusiveness & acceptance
(‘loyalty’)
Democracy (‘voice’)
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although on a systemic level the proper governance
methodof coordination is inplace, ‘operational reme-
dies or support’ may be needed to overcome residual
risks of failure in specific avenues or projects rele-
vant to the public interest (e.g. of setting up renew-
able energy utilities).
Ideally, these remedies or this support, by regula-
tion or by institutional arrangements such as PPP,
can adequately tackle such risks at ‘mere’ operational
failure. Possibly though, the systemic choice (of Step
2) has to be reconsidered, as wisdom requires that
government also compares the risks or ‘transaction
costs’ of accompanying a chosenmodeof governance
coordination with a particular operational PPP, with
those of other governance mode and PPP combina-
tions.
For renewable energy, a particular factor in this
operational equation and comparisonwill be the role
of infrastructure/grids (as aspect of its ‘technical na-
ture’), themulti-level andmulti-actor governance and
related mixtures of interests (as aspect of organiza-
tion), as well as reliability and universal access (as as-
pects of policy principles). Ultimately, the compari-
son of possible coordinative project strategies entails
that the chosen solution, such as of a particular type
of PPP to remedy residual risks of failure, should not
give rise to other risks at failure, typical to its own
particular nature.
Inmore general terms, this choice of coordination
mode should comewith the realisation that any form
of coordination in innovative policy projects, such as
on renewable energy, involves the risk of a specific
type of failure, as already referred to in the begin-
ning of Step 2 (on systemic level) and relevant in this
Step on an operational level (of actors involved in
project related transactions). The risks of failure are
typically related to different modes of coordination:
(i) market failure, (ii) network failure and (iii) hierar-
chical/government failure.48 In practice these cate-
gories of failure in innovative policy projects can ex-
press in a multitude of ways, reaching way beyond
the descriptive scope of this article. Table 4 suffices
with giving a number of examples of each type of
failure.
Failure to innovateandmove forward inareas such
as that of renewable energy not only renders policies
ineffective, but also ties in with legitimacy. Pro-ac-
tively seeking stronger legitimacy (in society as a
whole and amongst participants – especially in terms
of shared beliefs and consent), may be a tool in im-
proving chances at success. Retrospectively, failure
may give rise to critical (societal) comments and a
loss of trust in all or some of the participants’ will-
ingness to secure success, and especially of govern-
ment’s ability to deliver upon commitment to the
public interest (and its choice of governance mode).
In this respect, the above (innovation) risks also
attest to the need for ex ante attention to the opera-
tional ‘alignment’ of actor interests within the PPP
arrangement. Furthermore, the public interest is key
to government’s involvement in PPP – as otherwise
(in a liberal State) there simply would be no legiti-
mate place for government in the PPP arrangement.
As a consequence of this premise, ideally (to ensure
operational ‘coordinative optimality’) the interests of
private parties to a PPP must sufficiently and posi-
tively align with this public interest. If not, (non) ac-
tions of participants may become mutually counter-
productive and the collective result is likely to be sub-
optimal (if not worse). We do not purport that align-
ment requires a full match or indeed identification
48 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press,
New York 1985. Wolf, “Non-market failure revisited: The anato-
my and physiology of government deficiencies.” in Hanusch (ed.),
Anatomy of Government Deficiencies. Springer – Verlag, New
York 1981. Levačić (fn. 35). Klein Woolthuis/Lankhuizen/Gilsing,
A system failure framework for innovation policy design, Techno-
vation, Vol. 25/2005, pp. 609-619.
Table 4: Forms of failure
Step 3: Risks of failure in governance of innovative projects
Risks Market Network Hierarchy
Forms of failure (with spe-
cial relevance to innovation –
examples)
Lacking of investment, nega-
tive external or distributive
effects of risks
Ostracism (non-inclusivity)
or, hierarchy within the net-
work
Supply control, bureaucratic
inefficiency, lack of knowl-
edge
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– if this would even be theoretically and practically
possible or feasible – but interests should match in
as much as is necessary to arrive at a common or
shared strategy for (involvement in) the policy
project at hand.Meanwhile, it shouldbe kept inmind
that the innovative nature of a project poses inher-
ent risks and may reveal (financial and reputational)
vulnerabilities of participants, which make it all the
more important that alignment of interests is se-
cured. Further, we believe that the success of align-
ment (leading to a shared strategy) will correlate, al-
so in terms of reciprocal expectations, with themode
of governance/coordinationmechanism uponwhich
PPP is applied, and consequently (see Step 4) to the
type of PPP that is chosen.
4. Step 4: Choosing the PPP Type
The two previous (systemic and operational) consid-
erations (of Steps 2 and 3) should lead to an align-
ment enshrined in a proper choice of, not only the
mode of governance/coordination, but also the cor-
responding type of PPP, fit to act within the mode of
governance and suitable to adequately respond to
residual risks of failure. These types of PPPs list as
three distinct governance-actor arrangements, in-
volved in the performance of different types of trans-
actions, typical to markets, networks or hierarchies;
according to their characteristic mode of coordina-
tion. In general terms, we define a PPP as a legally
structured partnership between one or more public
authorities and one or more corporate entities gov-
erned by private law, which focuses on the develop-
ment and execution of a common strategy for the re-
alisation of a policy project. The above implies that
such a PPP can be applied within the three alterna-
tive modes of coordination, if and when its basic or-
ganizational characteristics fit basic coordinative
characteristics – as, by analogy, organisms need to fit
with their habitat. For this reason we distinguish the
following types ofPPP: ‘PPP formarket coordination’
or ‘Market PPP’, ‘PPP for network coordination’ or
‘NetworkPPP’ and ‘PPPforhierarchical coordination’
or ‘Authoritative PPP’. Table 549 shows a summary of
these PPP types, along four functional characteris-
tics.
The objective of the Market PPP is about the exe-
cution of or strategy to put a policy project into ef-
fect on the basis of a (mutually beneficial) economic
exchange against the background of separate public
and private positions. This leads to PPP as an opera-
tional configuration, as,within the field of renewable
energy policy initiatives, in the construction of
durable utilities, such as wind farms for energy gen-
eration or smart grids for energy distribution.50 Gov-
49 Table data: see Heldeweg/Sanders (fn. 4)
50 Ibid.
Table 5: Types of PPPs
PPP
4 Characteristics of function-
ing
3 Types
Market-PPP Network-PPP Authoritative-PPP
Objective of collaboration Efficient transactions Provoke useful participation Legitimate decision-making
Internal relations between
actors
Calculative coordination by
principal-agent relations
Strategic coordination by par-
ticipation
Unitary coordination by
shared powers & responsibil-
ities
Results of collaboration
(output)
Contractual set of perfor-
mance relations
Convergence of organisation-
al behaviour
Sequence of decisions with
public authority
Intended societal effect of re-
sults (outcomes)
Steering behaviour by con-
tractual obligations
Steering behaviour by strate-
gic coordination
Steering behaviour by com-
mand or prohibition
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ernment formulates the project (possibly upon prior
‘private hints’) and then the phases from designing
and building the construction or infrastructure
through tomaintenance and/or operation are put out
to tender, as in the form of a DBFM(O) contract.51
Thus governmentmay, as a ‘launching customer’, use
PPP in a fieldwhere, otherwise,market-players them-
selves would not spontaneously take up a sufficient
number of projects or be successful in their promise.
One could therefor argue that this type of PPP is a
means of government remedying market failure in
the renewable energy field.
In the ‘Network PPP’ there is partnership in a vol-
untary association, with the aim of formulating a
joint strategy, such as when a municipality consults
with retailers, housing corporations and electricity
network operators about improved energy-efficien-
cy of a given town centre, or when a foundation is
established in which government, industry and
NGOs discuss strategy to bundle knowledge towards
enhancedgreengasdeployment.Significantly, in this
type of PPP, public and private parties retain their
own tasks, powers and responsibilities, so that im-
plementation of the strategy by formal decisions to
this effect remains amatter for each of the parties in-
volved.52 One could consider this type of PPP a rem-
edy to the inadequacy of spontaneous private party
networks or to unfortunate exclusion of relevant par-
ties, but also as an arrangement to overcome prob-
lems that markets and governments face in getting
new initiatives underway by creating a stronger con-
vergence in the renewable energy momentum.
Finally, we distinguish the ‘Authoritative PPP’,
which is underpinned by partnership at the strategy
formulation level, but which main (or indeed exclu-
sive) task is taking decisions with public authority,
binding to citizens, based in a legal power attributed
to the PPP as a legal entity.53 As an example in the
renewable energy sector, we could think of ‘energy
funds’, operating as ‘participation quangos’. Such
partnerships of representatives or appointees from
government, industry and NGOs operate as one and
as suchperform legal actswithpublic authority. Thus
subsidies, vouchers and guarantees are provided, es-
pecially to promising new initiatives that would oth-
erwise not surface – supported by a fund financed
by government, but possibly also by private parties
involved. Similarly, one could think of a PPP certifi-
cation agency following a public law regulation on
energy efficiency,which is governed by a board, com-
posed of public and private party representatives or
appointees.
5. Step 5: Choosing the Legal Form
Once at ‘Step 4.’ the choice of governance/coordina-
tion and corresponding PPP-type has been made, a
decision as regards its legal form is opportune. Dif-
ferent arguments play a part in the assessment
process towards a choice of legal form, which also
differ from one situation (such as the type of policy
field) to another. Theparticipants in a legal formmay,
for example, attach importance to limitation of lia-
bility or to tax transparency. In addition to partici-
pants, restrictions also follow from regulation, in-
creasingly on a multi-level basis such as by EU rules.
Together, these considerations guide the choice of a
proper legal form.
In the most general legal terms, a distinction may
be made between three types of legal persons.54 (i)
associations – rooted in personified alliances, where
original long-term contractual relations are trans-
formed into collective decisionmaking andmember-
ship; (ii) corporations – rooted in personified part-
nerships, where joint ownership of one or more ob-
jects and/or capital goods, are transformed into col-
lective decision-making and shareholdership; (iii)
foundations – rooted in personified funds, where
ownership of a collection of assets devoted to a spe-
cific objective is transformed into collective decision-
making and an objective purpose. These distinctions
operate throughout the public and the private (law)
realm, but do not exclusively correspond with the
ideal type coordinationmechanisms of markets, net-
works or hierarchies – although corporations best fit
markets, and associations and foundations are most
suitable to networks and hierarchies. Similarly PPP-
typesmaybemoulded intoall of thebasic legal forms.
Clearly, further analysis reaches well beyond the
scope of this article – given that, in our opinion, the
nature of the renewable energy field does not point
at a particular choice in legal form.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ruiter, Types of institutions as patterns of regulated behavior, Res
Publica 10 (3)/2004.
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The same may be said about the possibility of or-
ganising PPP other than in a legal personality, but by
entitlement (such as in property rights, such as in
land), or by obligation (such as following contractu-
al agreement). In reference to the above description
of the ‘Authoritative PPP’ we can rule out the possi-
bility of a form other than as a legal entity, given that
it can act only upon a (general but) personified legal
power and accompanying personal accountability.
Consequently, Table 6 merely aims to present the
most basic elements of choice.
6. Step 6: Putting Controls into Place
This is not a perfect world. That was clear when up-
on Step 2, making a systemic choice of a legitimate
mode of public governance, we considered it neces-
sary to next take step 3, and consider operational
risks at systemic failure, and subsequently, in Step
4, choose the PPP-type that would remedy those
risks. It may seem as if we have by now ‘closed the
gap’, but alas. Legitimacy is about more than ideal-
type modes of governance and choice of legal form,
it is also about if andhoworganizations (and the peo-
ple and systems within) actually perform – in reali-
ty. This performance may not agree with the criteria
of legitimacy and (perhaps as a result) of effective-
ness as enshrined in the design of the particular type
of PPP. Organizations and persons within may re-
sponddifferently to the relevant incentives (e.g. plac-
ing private concerns before the agreed public inter-
ests) or may make mistakes upon insufficient or in-
correct information or knowledge or flawed intelli-
gence or be confronted with failing technical sys-
tems.55 Thus there remains a chance that, while in
operation, opportunistic ormisguided strategies and
decisions, or technical failure, lead PPPs to not or no
longer act legitimately and/or (as a result) effective-
ly.
Such risksmayhowever be avoided,mitigated and
even remedied by putting controls into place from
the onset; either as part of the PPP-design (‘internal
controls’), or as a matter of regulating (part of) the
institutional environment in which PPPs are to op-
erate (‘external controls’).
As to internal controls, the most basic concern is
to avoid that manager’s interests or mistakes deflect
a legal person’s performance from its leading inter-
est (and corresponding objectives/mission/task).
While looking at the three basic legal forms distin-
guished in Step 5, internal controls should primari-
ly protect: the shareholder interests in corporations,
with a focus on competitiveness (e.g. through a su-
pervisory board of directors); the membership inter-
ests in associations, with a focus on service to collec-
tively determined objectives (e.g. membership meet-
55 According to Hanlon’s razor, attributed to Robert J. Hanlon,
problems often lie with the latter, although we are keen to think
otherwise: ‘Never attribute to malice that which is adequately
explained by stupidity’.
Table 6: Summary of legal forms
Step 5: Determination of the legal form of PPP
Legal forms 3 Modes of governance
Market Network Hierarchy
As entity (organisation)
3 Basic entities:
– association
– corporation
– foundation
Esp. corporations Esp. associations and founda-
tions
Esp. associations and foun-
dations
E.g. company (Ltd), coopera-
tives, partnership
E.g. trust, union, interest
group, voluntary committees
E.g. representative, corporate
or cooperative body, public
corporation, public office,
quangos
Not as entity (entitle-
ment/obligation)
Contract
Property/ownership
Contract
Property/ownership
not feasible
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ings or, when public, a parliament); the established
(non-personal) interest in foundations, with a focus
on purposive deployment of assets (e.g. through a
stakeholder committee or a parliamentary commit-
tee). In all cases, in as much as these interests call for
controls on efficiency (and effectiveness) a controller
or audit function may be useful.
External controls are about upholding basic inter-
ests and rules, characteristic to an institutional envi-
ronment, in the face of opportunistic and imprudent
strategies and actions: of private interest in efficient
market-transactions, through controls on compli-
ance with rules on fair competition and consumer
protection (e.g. regulators and arbitration); of con-
certed interest in collaborative network-transactions,
through controls on compliance with rules on social
inclusion and professionalism (e.g. oversight bodies
and courts); of public interest in authoritative gov-
ernment-transactions, through controls on compli-
ancewith rules on proper public service and citizens’
freedoms (e.g. inspectorates and courts).
The hybridity of PPPs is about introducing incen-
tives and attracting resources to an environment,
which does not naturally have an appeal to them, but
without them has difficulty in delivering certain
goods or services, such as sustainable energy. Adding
a private interest to a public context (by Authorita-
tive PPP) or a public interest to a private context (by
Market- or Network-PPP) is seen as a means to cre-
ate better opportunities for initiating or facilitating
innovative (sustainable energy) projects.
Of course this deliberate mixture of interests and
institutional contexts challenges ideal-type internal
and external controls. Suddenly, the design of con-
trols needs to also address possible concerns over
‘outside interests’ introduced by PPP (at Step 4) as a
remedy against residual risks of failure (identified in
Step 3) – such as a public service interest in a mar-
ket environment, a commercial interest in a network
environment, or a voluntary societal interest in a gov-
ernment environment).
Of course, meanwhile ‘inside interests’, enshrined
in the institutional environment in which a PPP is to
function,maynotbe infringedupon. For else, instead
of remedying failure, the PPP would indeed cause
failure – such as when government involvement in
a Market-PPP would distort competition in a market
environment.
The next and final table (no. 7.) gives some exam-
ples of possible safeguards relevant in the design of
internal and external controls for PPPs, both relevant
to outside and inside interests.57
Finally, although the above control concerns are
primarily about legitimacy, they may also touch on
effectiveness. Legitimate performance, through en-
suring that inputs to decision-making reflect relevant
interests, and commitment to achieve outputs
promised upon decision-taking, may also impact up-
on effectiveness, not in the least as such performance
enhances chances of all interested parties to be sup-
portive of a PPP’s success. Such support is of para-
mount importance to properly respond to (inevitable
situations of) perverse interests, inadequate informa-
tion, intelligence or technical systems, posing a risk
to performance of a PPP, both as a matter of legiti-
macy and effectiveness.
VI. Conclusion
Design of legitimate PPP, such as on innovation in
the field of renewable energy, is a complex challenge.
A challenge that may be called for, as we cannot (al-
ways) expect private parties, within markets and/or
civil society to by themselves and spontaneously, pro-
vide timely innovative solutions (and commit to
them). In turn, government, as ‘driven’ by the public
interest in renewable energy, cannot be expected to
deliver such solutions on its own merit.
Collaboration by PPP is an important option to
overcome mutual ‘failures’ and get new and innova-
tive projects underway to (further) develop the poli-
cy to achieve the technological and practicable break-
throughs that are needed – but to arrange such PPP
is not without pitfalls.
This article has focused especially on how govern-
ment may seek to use legitimate PPPs against the
backdrop of renewable energy as a public interest. It
shows that different types of PPP may be used to le-
gitimately promote and safeguard public interests
and that the choicebetween these typesmust beguid-
ed by the notion of ‘legitimate public governance’,
which in turn requires proper reflection upon the
most suited mode of governance/coordination both
57 A more nuanced analysis would show that controls may come in
‘hard’ or ‘soft’ varieties. ‘Hard’ mechanisms are required by law
and are binding for the functioning of the PPP (such as approval
by the parliament), whereas ‘soft’ mechanisms are not compulso-
ry and of a more social or informal nature (e.g. advice).
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on a systemic and on an operational level – which al-
so includes monitoring on effectiveness, as legitima-
cy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of
good legal governance.
To this end an ex-ante analysis framework has
been presented, providing a progressive scheme for
making a proper choice of PPP. This analysis frame-
work is built up in six consecutive steps: (i) establish-
ing the public interest, (ii) the systemic choice of le-
gitimate public governance, (iii) considering opera-
tional risks, (iv) choosing the PPP type, (v) choosing
the legal form, and finally (vi) putting controls into
place.
We hope this framework, which is still the subject
of further (empirical) research, will prove useful in
the design of proper legitimate PPP arrangements –
especially in the renewable energy field. The need
for innovation in energy utilities deserves a thorough
analysis of public-private collaboration – next to or
in conjunction with other instruments (e.g. public
ownership and regulation) – as government policy
tools.
Table 7: Designing controls
Step 6: PPPs and controls safeguarding outside interests while not infringing on inside interests
PPP-type Interest Examples
(1.) Market Public (‘out-
side’)
Internally: appoint a public interest commissioner
Externally: empower an oversight body/regulator (e.g. benchmarking) or audit
office
Private (‘in-
side’)
No State aid; retain fair trade and consumer protection; avoid unnecessary bureau-
cratic checks & balances
(2.) Network (&
gov’t)
Public (‘out-
side’)
Internally: appoint a public interest commissioner
Externally: organize meeting with parliamentary committee
Private (‘in-
side’)
No government dominance on shared decision making; ensure stakeholder participa-
tion
(3.) Authoritative
(& firms/NGOs)
Private (‘out-
side’)
Internally: collective decision-making; controller-function; performance benchmark-
ing (on effectiveness and/or efficiency)
Externally: review of public procurement (courts); stakeholder participation
Public (‘in-
side’)
Due process: retain independence and impartiality; avoid regulatory capture;
parliamentary and/or judicial control
